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I. INTRODUCTION
During this century, petroleum' has been one of the most important
commodities in the modern world, referred to as "critical to national
strategies and crucial to international politics." 2  As the modern
petroleum industry emerged in developing countries, where ownership
of petroleum almost universally belongs to the state,' international oil
companies with the necessary capital and expertise controlled
petroleum exploration and exploitation.4  Even though almost all
petroleum producing countries today have state-owned oil companies,
this situation has not changed substantially.5 This reality demands
that the international oil company and the state reach some agreement
6about the development of those resources.
Exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources places the
international oil company in a uniquely complex business arrangement
with a foreign country. This arrangement links the government, who
owns the resources, with the companies, who have the technology,
capital and equipment necessary for development, in a sector where the
1. For the purposes of this paper the term "petroleum" will be used as a synonym for
both oil and gas.
2. ZHIGUO GAO, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CONTRACTS: CURRENT TRENDS AND
NEW DIRECTIONS 1 (1994).
3. BERNARD TAVERNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE REGULATION OF THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY 11 (1994). The exceptions to this rule, where ownership of underground
petroleum belongs to the owner of the land, usually occur in developed countries such as
the United States and the Netherlands. Id.
4. See GAO, supra note 2, at 1. See generally Ernest E. Smith & John S.
Dzienkowski, A Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petroleum Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT'L L.
J. 13 (1989) (surveying international petroleum arrangements since the beginning of this
century).
5. See Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 4, at 35. See also Oil.com, at
http://www.wn.com/?t=oilcom/left/production.txt (last visited Oct. 14, 2000) (sampling
current worldwide petroleum explorations).
6. The term "agreement" in this context can mean many things, including
production sharing agreements, licenses, concessions, service contracts, participation
agreements and joint operating agreements. See R. Daniel Vock, Petroleum Development
Agreements: Form and Drafting, J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 251, 251 (1990)
(describing the complexity of agreements generated in the petroleum industry). See also
SAMIR MANKABADY, ENERGY LAW 25-73 (1990); Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 4, at 35.
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stakes, risks and possible profit margins all can be very high.! The
questions of how to contribute to this "partnership" and how to allocate
the profits are fundamental issues in the arrangement among the
foreign country and the international oil company."
Since these petroleum agreements require a large initial outlay of
capital, and long-term investment in projects including exploration,
appraisal and development 9 that must be recouped from earnings, these
investments expose the international oil company to substantial risk for
an extended period.' ° Simultaneously, because petroleum prices are
unpredictable, an apparently profitable agreement for the country can
look undesirable after it is entered, especially if the international oil
company's work proves highly productive." These factors combine to
encourage the foreign government to seek adjustments to long-term
agreements in response to both political pressure and changed
circumstances. 2 On the other hand, the international oil company tries
to avoid the renegotiation of the agreement, the effect of subsequent
changes to the country's law, or even outright nationalization of the
company's assets.'
3
Over time, companies have tried to deal with the risks involved in
petroleum transactions either by: spreading risk; insuring against risk;
defending against the risk; structuring and managing risk; or creating
contractual mechanisms for risk management." When a company tries
to "spread the risk" it usually tries to form joint ventures to create a
united and stronger front against an interventionist host country." A
company can also try to "insure against the risk" by buying an
insurance policy to protect the company from contractual changes in the
agreed upon financial regime, including foreign exchange guarantees.'6
7. See Christopher T. Curtis, The Legal Security of Economic Development
Agreements, 29 HARV. INT'L L. J. 317, 317-18 (1988). See also GAO, supra note 2, at 1.
8. See GAO, supra note 2, at 1.
9. See Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment
Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. INT'L L. J. 215,
227 (1996).
10. See Curtis, supra note 7, at 318. As a general rule, petroleum projects involve ten
years or more of exploration in areas such as geological surveys, drilling, and appraisal.
WORLD MINERAL EXPLORATION: TRENDS AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 2-11 (John E. Tilton et al.
eds., 1988).
11. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 227.
12. Id. at 233
13. Id.
14. Id. at 233-34.
15. See Ivan K. Fong & John Kent Walker, International High-Technology Joint
Ventures: An Antitrust and Antidumping Analysis, 7 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAw. 57, 61
(Winter 1999). See also Joel Davidow, Special Antitrust Issues Raised by International
Joint Ventures, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1031, 1037 (1985). See generally Roger L.M. Dunbar,
International Renegotiations: The Case of the Dominican Republic and Falconbridge, 15
NAT. RESOURCES F. 258, 263-68 (1991).
16. See Jorg-Dietrich Wirmistich, Coverage of Political Risk by National Agencies:
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"Defending against the risk" is a strategy that requires the foreign
company to try to use economic, financial, and political persuasion and
leverage to discourage governments from abrogating investment
agreements. 7 Companies have also tried to "structure and manage"
through actions that include association with the host state, low
visibility in the project, and flexibility in investment to be able to adapt
to changing pressures and expectations." Finally, the oil company can
try to reduce risk by contract through clauses that provide for
international arbitration, choice of law, and offshore accounts, as well
as with stabilization clauses.19
Out of this broad field of risk management devices,2 ° this article
focuses on the use of stabilization clauses to protect the international oil
company. Part II defines and describes the types of stabilization
clauses. It also reviews the risks stabilization clauses are intended to
reduce, including financial and non-financial concerns. Part III reviews
the criteria used to apply and interpret stabilization clauses, both under
municipal law and principles of international law, and Part IV surveys
how those criteria have been applied to stabilization clauses in eight
arbitrations. Part V concludes with some general observations about
the treatment of stabilization clauses in those arbitrations.
II. STABILIZATION CLAUSES DEFINED
An international oil company may try to minimize risk through
contract provisions." Many risks are difficult or impossible to control
by contract, such as commercial (price volatility), financial (interest rate
volatility), geological (no deposit found), technical (failure of the
installations to perform as planned), managerial (labor problems) and
natural disasters.2 Stabilization clauses address one specific type of
risk that a contract can affect: political risk.2  This part will describe
The German Investment Scheme, in PROMOTION OF DIRECT INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 123 (1986). See also John C. Kinna, Investing in Developing Countries:
Minimization of Political Risk, 1 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 89 (1983). See generally
Douglas A. Paul, New Developments in Private Political Risk Insurance and Trade
Finance, 21 INT'L LAW. 709 (1987).
17. See Kinna, supra note 16, at 95-99. See also Jurgen Voss, The Protection and
Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: Interests,
Interdependencies, Intricacies, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 686, 686-88 (1982).
18. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 234.
19. Id.
20. See GAO, supra note 2, at 201-240. See generally Taverne, supra note 3.
21. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 221.
22. Id.
23. See Curtis, supra note 7, at 346. See also Eli Lauterpacht, Issues of Compensation
and Nationality in the Taking of Energy Investments, 8 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L.
241, 243-44 (1990). Stabilization clauses are only one type of provision used by foreign
companies in an attempt to protect their investment. Arbitration and choice of law
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that risk and then review the types of stabilization clauses available.
A. Risks
A central question about the security of a petroleum transaction is
the nature and degree of risk to which the investment is exposed.24
Long-term resource and energy projects such as oil and gas exploration
and mining have a serious need for stability that goes beyond short-
term projects. 5 Key financial requirements of these investors include
rapid investment recovery through accelerated depreciation and
amortization, long loss carry-forward periods, reasonable royalty rates
responsive to mineral prices and a flexible system of income or cash-
flow based taxation triggered only after investment recovery.26
To avoid financial uncertainty about these requirements,
companies frequently ask for assurances of stability of the status quo.
27
Sometimes these promises are made as administrative orders or
regulations, however they are more frequently made through legislation
211or in specific contract provisions.
Other non-financial concerns are also important to foreign
companies. 29 The greatest worry, of course, is that the foreign country
would expropriate or nationalize the company's operation.0 This can
occur directly, through legislation, or indirectly, through interference
with the investors' freedom to control the enterprise and make a profit."'
clauses are also frequently used. See N. Stephen Kinsella & Paul E. Comeaux, Political
Risk and Petroleum Investment in Russia, CURRENTS 48 (Summer 1993)[hereinafter
Political Risk in Russia]. See also N. Stephen Kinsella & Paul E. Comeaux, Reducing the
Political Risk of Investing in Russia and Other C.I.S. Republics: International Arbitration
and Stabilization Clauses, RUSSIAN OIL & GAS GUIDE 21 (April 1993)[hereinafter
Reducing Risk in Russia].
24. See Lauterpacht, supra note 23, at 242.
25. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 266.
26. Id. at 224.
27. Id. at 226.
28. See PETER FISCHER & THOMAS W. WAELDE, COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL
CONCESSIONS AND RELATED INSTRUMENTS 195, 481 (1981). Since resource projects are
usually funded to a considerable extent by external loan financing, these financiers have
as their core concern the ability of the company to repay its debt. Accordingly,
stabilization of the fiscal and foreign exchange regimes are essential requirements that
lenders want to see in concession agreements. See generally Grover R. Castle, Project
Finance: The Alternative That Can Leverage Borrowing Power, 5 NAT. RESOURCES F. 196
(1981); Z. Mikdashi, Oil Funding and International Financial Arrangements, 9 NAT.
RESOURCES F. 283 (1985).
29. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 230.
30. See Lauterpacht, supra note 23, at 242-43. See C.F. Amerasinghe, Issues of
Compensation for the Taking of Alien Property in the Light of Recent Cases and Practice,
41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 22 (1992) for a thorough discussion of compensation for
expropriation.
31. Lauterpacht, supra note 23, at 242-43.
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Similarly, companies want protection from changes in labor law
that could result in increased employment costs, government
intervention in production decisions,32 unexpected increases in energy
and infrastructure usage costs, 3 changes to accounting rules which
would result in increased taxes, unexpected obligations to provide
infrastructure, or mandated local service and supply contracts.34
Currently, the issue of most concern in this area is the imposition of
new environmental obligations by subsequent regulation, or by
administrative or judicial rulings interpreting existing law.35
B. Types of Stabilization Clauses
A concession agreement differs from a standard contract in that one
of the parties is a sovereign state. 36 A state has sovereign power over
property and can change its laws. To reduce the tension between these
powers and the imposition of a contractual limitation on them, an oil
company can ask the country for specific assurances that can be
enforced under international law.37
Stabilization clauses "specifically seek to secure the agreement
against future government action or changes in law," either legislative
or regulatory.3 8 More specifically, a stabilization clause is a specific
commitment by the foreign country not to alter the terms of the
agreement, by legislation or any other means, without the consent of
the other contracting party.39
Stabilization clauses can be divided into a number of categories.0
32. Examples would include orders to reduce production or damaging the asset base
of the investment through mandated overproduction.
33. Examples include railroad and pipeline charges.
34. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 230.
35. Id. at 230-31.
36. See e.g. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), 27 I.L.R.
117 (1963) (an arbitration relating to the interpretation of a concession agreement
between the government of Saudi Arabia and the Standard Oil Company of California).
See also Michael E. Dickstein, Revitalizing the International Law Governing Concession
Agreements 6 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law 54, 54 n.1, 68 (1988); Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan
Kinsella, Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties,
Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance, 15 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 16 (1994)[hereinafter Developing Countries].
37. See Comeaux & Kinsella, Developing Countries, supra note 36, at 18; Curtis,
supra note 7, at 345-46.
38. Curtis, supra note 7, at 346.
39. See Michelle Flores, A Practical Approach to Allocating Environmental Liability
and Stabilizing Foreign Investment in the Energy Sectors of Developing Countries, 12
COLO. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 141, 159-61 (2001).
40. See KEITH W. BLINN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND
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By agreeing to a stabilization clause, the foreign government purports
to alienate its right to unilaterally change the rights promised to and
relied upon by the foreign oil company.41 A clause that provides the
government may not unilaterally modify or terminate the contract has
been called an "intangibility clause."42 Another variety, usually called a
"stabilization clause stricto sensu," states that the governing law of the
contract shall be that of the contracting state at the time the contract
was executed, thereby preventing the application of subsequent changes
in the contracting state's law. 43  Another type of stabilization clause
provides that the agreement shall be performed consistently with "good
will" or in "good faith," thus precluding unilateral modification or
termination." For example, since international law does not prohibit
expropriation but does require some type of compensation, a
stabilization clause can help give the company some type of protection
in the event of appropriation.4 5 These clauses may appear in either a
broad form or a narrow form that stabilizes only limited aspects of the
contract, such as the applicable tax regime .4
III. APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF STABILIZATION CLAUSES
When a dispute arises between a foreign oil company and its host
state over a concession agreement, the choice of law governing the
dispute, especially as it relates to the validity of a stabilization clause,
is very important. Because the interpretation of a stabilization clause
in an international agreement can involve strands of arguments from
international public law, national law, and possibly an international lex
mercatoria, the resulting issues are arguably some of the most complex
in international business law.47
Traditionally, most disputes related to concession agreements were
EXPLOITATION AGREEMENTS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLICY ASPECTS 284, 302 (1986)
(remarking that there are three different types of stabilization clauses). Curtis, supra
note 7, at 346 (stating that there are four different types of stabilization clauses).
41. Coneaux & Kinsella, Developing Countries, supra note 36, at 23. See also Curtis,
supra note 7, at 321.
42. See Curtis, supra note 7, at 347.
43. See id. at 346-47.
44. Curtis, supra note 7, at 346-47.
45. STEPEHN M. SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 401-15 (1994)
(discussing the UN Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources).
There is general recognition that states have the right to nationalize, "expropriate or
requisition these natural resources as long as the owner is paid appropriate
compensation." G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc.
A/5217 (1962) [hereinafter General Assembly Resolution]. See also Amerasinghe, supra
note 30, at 32-36 (discussing the impact of UN Resolutions on the understanding of what
is "appropriate" compensation).
46. SCHWEBEL, supra note 45; General Assembly Resolution supra note 45;
Amerasinghe supra note 45, at 33. See also BLINN, supra note 40, at 302-04.
47. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 237.
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thought to be controlled by the domestic law of the nation granting the
concession.48 More recently, a theory has developed in which the
contract is considered to be "internationalized" because it contains a
stabilization clause, and is thus not subject to the law of the host
nation.49 The question of whether municipal law governs the contract or
whether the contract has been internationalized has caused much
dispute between developed and developing countries. 50
Developing nations - generally the states granting the concession -
argue that their national law governs the concession and that
international law should not apply because the cancellation of a
contract with a private party is a prerogative implicit in the concept of
national sovereignty."1 When the government's actions do not constitute
a breach of contract under that state's law, even if they are inconsistent
with the contract, then the government has the right to modify its
contract with or without compensation to the private contracting
party. 12 Thus, if a stabilization clause in an international petroleum
agreement is subject to municipal law, it will likely be declared
invalid .
Proponents of a nation's right to "permanent sovereignty" are found
in the views of several "formidable commentators" and pronouncements
from the U.N. General Assembly supporting the notion of permanent
sovereignty.' This idea is embodied in the following pronouncement:
"[t]he description of this sovereignty as permanent signifies that the
territorial State never loses its legal capacity to change the status or
the method of exploitation of those resources, regardless of any
arrangement that may have been made."5
The proposition that municipal law governs an international
petroleum concession, however, has not had much support unless there
is no ambiguous or specifically contradictory provision in the contract.
56
Developed countries - whose corporations tend to be the private
contracting parties - insist that sovereign states must follow their
contractual promises and that international law governs disputes about
those promises, so a breaching party must either specifically perform its
48. See Michael E. Dickstein, Revitalizing the International Law Governing
Concession Agreements, 6 INT'L TAx & Bus. LAW. 54, 54 (1988).
49. Dickstein, supra note 48, at 54.
50. Id. at 55.
51. Id.
52. Dickstein, supra note 48, at 55. See also E. NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 188-89 (1965).
53. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 239.
54. See Dickstein, supra note 48, at 62-63.
55. See Edouardo Jiminez de Arbchaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalization
of Foreign Owned Property, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 179-180 (1978).
56. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 238.
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obligations or pay monetary compensation equal to the full prospective
value of the contract. 7
International law is not per se applicable to every concession
agreement.58 To gain such protection the oil company must seek to
"internationalize" the contract. 9 The doctrine of internationalization,
also called transnationalization, delocalization, or denationalization, is
intended to ensure a form of binding dispute resolution which is not
under the control of the state party.60
An express choice of law provision may settle the question."' When
there is no express choice of law provision, three different theories have
been commonly used to prevent the application of the law of the foreign
state.62 These are the vacuum theory, the internationalization theory
and the theory of lex mercatoria.63
The internationalization theory states that some contracts are by
their very nature internationalized and thus subject to international
law.r The rationale is based on the mutual consent of the contracting
parties. Mutual consent has been accepted as a universal and well-
established principle about the autonomy of the will of the parties to the
contract.65 The internationalization of a concession agreement on this
basis had gained adherents over past decades, persuading many
arbitrators that a contract becomes internationalized because at the
time of negotiation that was what the parties consented to.6
57. Dickstein, supra note 48; Kinsella & Comeaux, Reducing Risk in Russia, supra
note 23, at 24.
58. See John Crawford & Wesley Johnson, Arbitrating with Foreign States and Their
Instrumentalities, 5 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 11, 12 (1986).
59. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 241.
60. Id.
61. See Derek William Bowett, State Contracts with Aliens: Contemporary
Developments on Compensation for Termination or Breach, 59 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49, 50
(1988). Parties can expressly chose to submit their contracts to either general principles
of law or international law. See Curtis, supra note 7, at 331. General principles of law
are a set of legal principles or rules shared in substance by the world's major legal system,
such as pacta sunt servanda. Many scholars consider public international law to be
different than those general principles of law. These differences will not be discussed in
this paper. For a thorough review of the subject, see generally Reese, The Law Governing
International Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 3 (H. Smit, N. Galston & S.
Levitsky eds. 1981).
62. See Bowett, supra note 61.
63. Id. at 50-53.
64. This was the view adopted by the arbitrator in Texaco v. Libyan Arab Republic
(TOPCO), 53 I.L.R. 389 (1977). This case will be further discussed in infra Part IV(B)(2).
65. See F.V. Garcia-Amador, State Responsibility in Case of Stabilization Clauses, 2
J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 23, 30 (1993).
66. Id. at 30-31. See also Bowett, supra note 61, at 51.
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IV. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS INTERPRETING STABILIZATION
CLAUSES
This part reviews international arbitrations concerning petroleum
concessions including a stabilization clause. Although these cases are
very complex and have many other interesting features, the focus is
solely on the features involving the stabilization clause.
A. Early Cases
1. Lena Goldfields, Ltd. v. U.S.S.R.67
On February 12, 1930, an almost insolvent English company began
arbitration proceedings against a hostile and large foreign state under
an ad hoc arbitration clause contained in a written concession
agreement signed by both parties.' The relationship started when
Lena Goldfields was incorporated in 1908 for the express purpose of
acquiring seventy percent of the shares of the Russian Lena Goldfields
Company, which had been created in 1855 to develop gold mining along
the river Lena and its tributaries in Siberia. 9 The relationship went
well until July 1918 when the new Soviet government nationalized all
mining properties without compensation, including the Lena's Russian
interests. In 1925, after two years of difficult negotiations between the
Soviet government and Lena Goldfields, the company ratified a
concession agreement which gave Lena Goldfields the exclusive right to
mine gold and other metals in the Urals and parts of Siberia. 71 The
concession period was to run in part for thirty years and in part for fifty
72years.
In October 1925, Lena Goldfields began operations on its
concession.73 By 1929, however, the Soviet government adopted a
number of policies that discouraged concessions agreements with
foreign capitalists. 74  As a result, Lena Goldfields was subjected to
67. Lena Goldfields Arbitration, ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
CASES (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1929-1930). See also A. Nussbaum, The Arbitration between
the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Government, CORNELL L.Q. 31, 42 (1950-51)
(reproducing the Lena award since the original English version has been lost).
68. See V.V. Veeder, The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: the Historical Roots of Three
Ideas, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 747 (1998) (giving a thorough review of the case and its
history).
69. Veeder, supra note 68, at 756-57.
70. Id. at 757.
71. Id. at 758.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 761.
74. Id.
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increasingly hostile treatment and was not able to meet the production
requirement of the concession agreement.75 Because the Soviet Union's
official harassment caused Lena Goldfields to not be able to carry on its
concessions, and because all attempts to negotiate settlement failed,
Lena Goldfields referred the matter to arbitration under an arbitration
clause within the agreement. 6
This case is the first arbitration that involved a choice-of-law clause
and a stabilization clause." Article 89 of the agreement was the choice
of law provision which stated that the "parties base[d] their relations
with regard to this agreements on the principle of good will and good
faith, as well as on reasonable interpretation of the terms of the
Agreement."8 Article 76 contained the stabilization clause under which
the Soviet Government promised to make no alteration in the
agreement by order, decree, or other unilateral act, or at all, except with
Lena's consent. 9
As a result of the interaction between the clauses of the agreement,
the Court of Arbitration determined for the first time that a contract
between a private party and a sovereign state might be
internationalized.80 The tribunal held that the agreement between
Lena Goldfields and the Soviet Government, while governed by Russian
law in respect to ordinary matters, was subject to the general principles
of law insofar as the contractual provisions safeguarding the company's
position were concerned. 8' The court did not elaborate, however, on the
relevance of Article 76, the stabilization clause of the concession
agreement.8' The significance of this award cannot be discounted
because it was the first time an arbitration panel held that other law,
besides national law, could govern the contractual relationship between
a foreign company and a private party.
2. Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil
Co. (NIOC) "
Sapphire was the next well-known major arbitration involving a
stabilization clause.4 A concession by the Iranian government
contained a choice-of-law clause similar to Lena Goldfields' in which
75. Veeder, supra note 68, at 762.
76. Id. at 762-63.




81. See Christopher Greenwood, State Contracts in International Law-The Libyan Oil
Arbitrations, 53 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L. 27, 41 (1982).
82. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 65, at 38.
83. 35 I.L.R. 136 (1967).
84. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 65, at 38.
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parties agreed to carry out the provisions in accordance with principles
of good faith and good will."' The stabilization clause stated that:
no general or statutory enactment, no administrative measure or
decree of any kind, made either by the government or by any
governmental authority in Iran (central or local), including NIOC, can
cancel the agreement or affect or change its provisions, or prevent or
hinder its performance. No cancellation, amendment or modification
16can take place except with the agreement of the two parties.
The arbitrator held first that the agreements contained no express
choice of law provisions." As a result, he decided that the agreement
between the parties should be construed in light of the provisions
currently stipulated to in other, similar Iranian agreements. He then
stated that the legal security of the investments, responsibilities, and
considerable risks of the foreign company, "could not be guaranteed...
by the outright application of Iranian law, which... is within the power
of the Iranian state to change."89 The arbitrator thus found that general
principles of law applied to the agreement, rather than Iranian law
alone.' The arbitrator, however, ignored the stabilization clause of the
concession agreement and refused to find that the State of Iran had
violated the clause, although the tribunal did find that where a
concession is prematurely terminated there is a duty to compensate.9 1
This decision is sometimes cited for the proposition that parties to
economic development agreements may specify that their contracts will
be governed by general principles of law.92  There are other
explanations, however, for why the arbitrator so ruled. For example,
the alleged violations of the agreement did not include any violation of
the specific obligations listed in the paragraph where the stabilization
clause is found.93
3. Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco)9
In 1954, the government of Saudi Arabia concluded an agreement
with Saudi Arabian Maritime Tankers, Ltd. and its owner, Aristotle
Onassis, under which the company was given a thirty year right of
85. 35 I.L.R. at 140.
86. 35 I.L.R. at 140.
87. Id. at 173.
88. Id. at 174-75.
89. Id. at 171.
90. Id. at 175.
91. See Amnerasinghe, supra note 30, at 37.
92. See Curtis, supra note 7, at 331-32.
93. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 65, at 39.
94. 27 I.L.R. 117 (1963).
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priority for the transport of Saudi Arabian oil.95 This concession was in
direct conflict with that of the Arabian American Oil Company
("Aramco"). Aramco held an oil concession agreement, granted by Saudi
Arabia in 1933, which gave Aramco the exclusive right to transport the
oil it extracted from its concession area in Saudi Arabia."
As a result of this conflict, there was an arbitration in 1955
between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Aramco held in Geneva
under an ad hoc submission agreement." There was a stabilization
clause in the Aramco concession agreement. The tribunal concluded
that "[bly reason of its very sovereignty within its territorial domain,
the State possess the legal powers to grant rights [by] which it forbids
itself to withdraw before the end of the concession."98 In 1958, the
tribunal ruled in favor of Aramco, stating that the government was
bound by its agreement with Aramco. 9 The agreement with Onassis's
company thus violated that agreement. The importance of this case is
that it was the first after Sapphire to recognize the validity of
stabilization clauses under international law.1 "6
B. Libyan Nationalization Cases
Despite earlier arbitral decisions, the legal status of contracts
between states and foreign companies remained "so obscure and
controversial" that any new arbitral or judicial decisions created a great
deal of interest."' Three Libyan cases that arose after the Libyan
Government's nationalization of foreign companies' interest under long-
term oil concessions created this type of interest.1 "2
95. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 373 (3d ed. 1999).
96. Id. at 373.
97. Id.
98. 27 I.L.R. at 168. See also Mobil Oil Iran, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 (1987) (Brower J. concurring) ("Contemporary international
precedents have concluded that such contractual [stabilization] provisions preclude a
sovereign during the stated period from exercising the rights it otherwise possess under
international law to take an alien's property for a public purpose, and without
discrimination and for a just compensation").
99. 27 I.L.R. at 169.
100. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 246.
101. See Greenwood, supra note 81, at 27.
102. There has been much academic commentary on these arbitrations and the many
issues presented by them. This Article focuses only on how the arbitral tribunal
interpreted the stabilization clause. For a thorough review of the procedures and arbitral
awards, see id. at 27-28; Robert B. von Mehren & P. Nicholas Kourides, International
Arbitrations Between States and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization
Cases, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 476 (July 1981); Robin C.A. White, Expropriation of the Libyan
Oil Concessions - Two Conflicting International Arbitrations, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1
(1981); Note, Unilateral Action by Oil-Producing Countries: Possible Contractual
Remedies of Foreign Petroleum Companies, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 63 (1985-86).
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The companies who were parties to these agreements, "in an
attempt to ensure contractual stability, had included clauses providing
that Libyan legislation was not to affect them without the consent of all
parties, as well as elaborate choice of law clauses designed to prevent
the contracts from being governed exclusively by Libyan law."1 3 Two of
the most difficult questions associated with contracts between private
parties and a foreign state were raised by these cases: (1) what is the
degree to which such parties are able to choose the law governing the
agreement; and, (2) whether nationalization can be rendered unlawful
through the drafting of these agreements.'"
The Royal Libyan Government granted the concessions subject to
the arbitral cases between 1955 and 1968. Each concession gave the
exclusive rights for fifty years to search for, extract and sell oil from
specific areas of Libyan territory.'05  All relevant provisions were
negotiated in identical terms since they were based upon a model
concession set out in a schedule to the Libyan Petroleum Law of 1955.'(
Three relevant provisions were designed to protect the interest of
the oil company.' 7 The first was a choice-of-law provision which sought
to remove the concession from the realm of Libyan law. Clause 28(7) in
its final form stated:
This concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance
with the principles of law of Libya common to the principles of
international law and in the absence of such common principles then
by and in accordance with the general principles of law, including such
of those principles as may have been applied by international
tribunals.'w
The second important provision was clause 16, the stabilization
clause, which excluded the contract from the ambit of any subsequent
changes in Libyan law. Clause 16 in its final version read as follows:
1. The Government of Libya will take all steps necessary to ensure
that the Company enjoys all the rights conferred by this Concession.
The contractual rights expressly created by this concession shall not be
altered except by mutual consent of the parties.
2. This Concession shall throughout the period of its validity be
construed in accordance with the Petroleum Law and the Regulations
103. See Greenwood, supra note 81, at 27-28.
104. Id. at 28.
105. See von Mehren & Kourides, supra note 102, at 478-79.
106. Id. at 478.
107. See Greenwood, supra note 81, at 28.
108. The history of the concession is reviewed in the Texaco Overseas Petroleum
Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab
Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389 (1978). Clause 28(7) is reproduced in 53 I.L.R. 297, at 303.
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in force on the date of execution of the agreement of amendment by
which this paragraph 2 was incorporated into this concession
agreement. Any amendment to or repeal of such Regulations shall not
affect the contractual rights of the Company without its consent.'09
Finally, clause 28 provided that all disputes would be submitted to
arbitration unless the parties arrived at a friendly settlement."' The
clauses specified that either party had the right to institute arbitration
proceedings."' Clause 28(3) took into consideration the possibility that
one party might seek to frustrate the arbitration clause by refusing to
appoint an arbitrator, stating that in that event the President of the
International Court of Justice would appoint a sole arbitrator."
Between 1971 and early 1974, the Libyan government nationalized
the interest and properties of foreign oil companies in Libya."3 "Three
separate arbitral tribunals adjudicated the lawfulness of these
nationalizations and the remedies available to the companies. Even
though the awards were generally favorable to the foreign companies,
"the arbitrators reached different conclusions despite the close
similarity between the cases.""'
1. BP Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd. v. Government of the
Libyan Arab Republic." 6
The BP case involved a single concession originally granted to
Nelson Bunker Hunt in 1957."' In 1960, Hunt assigned to BP an
undivided one-half share of its interest."8 BP carried out exploration
work and found oil in large quantities."9 BP then acted as operator for
Hunt and itself. 20 In 1969, the Royal Government was overthrown and
a revolutionary regime was established.' 2' The new government
109. 53 I.L.R. at 322.
110. Id. at 302.
111. Id. at 302.
112. Id. at 402-04.
113. See Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern
Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 479 (1992).
114. Id. at 479.
115. See Greenwood, supra note 81, at 28.
116. 53 I.L.R. 297.
117. Id. at 298.
118. See Greenwood, supra note 81, at 29.
119. Id.
120. Id. There was subsequent litigation between Mr. Hunt and BP in both the United
States and England. This litigation is outside the scope of the paper, but for a detailed
discussion of the agreements between the parties, see B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd v.
Hunt (No.2) [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783; Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Company, 570
S.W. 2d 503 (1978).
121. B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd v. Hunt (No.2) [19791 1 W.L.R. 783, at 792.
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promised to honor the concessions granted by its predecessor. 122 In
December of 1971, however, in retaliation for what was regarded as the
UK's failure to prevent Iran's occupation of three islands in the Persian
Gulf, the Libyan government nationalized BP's entire interest in the
concession. 123 Shortly after the nationalization law, BP wrote the
Libyan government to request arbitration. 124  After Libya failed to
respond, under clause 28(c), BP asked the President of the
International Court to appoint a sole arbitrator. 125 Libya took no part in
the proceedings and an award was rendered against the country.
26
The arbitrator determined that the agreement was a contractual
relationship belonging to the category of administrative contracts and
that by virtue of the stabilization clause, Libya had limited its "freedom
to change or terminate the concession by unilateral act unless it could
be shown that the changes was truly in the public interest."2' Thus,
while not expressly making reference to the stabilization clause in
clause 16 either in the passage of the award or in its final decisions, the
arbitrator did hold that nationalization constituted a fundamental




2. Texaco Overseas Oil Petroleum Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. v.
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (TOPCO).2 9
The Texaco / Calasiatic ("TOPCO") case had a similar background to
BP's case. Between 1955 and 1968, Texaco and Calasiatic, both United
States corporations, obtained fourteen oil concessions from the Royal
Libyan Government. 30  In 1973, the revolutionary government
nationalized fifty-one percent of the companies' interest in the
concessions.' When the companies commenced arbitration
proceedings, their remaining forty-nine percent interests were also
nationalized. 32  Libya did not respond to the companies' request to
submit to arbitration, but when the companies under clause 28(3) asked
the President of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") to appoint a
sole arbitrator, the Libyan government opposed such appointment in a
122. See Greenwood, supra note 81, at 29.
123. Id.
124. 53 I.L.R. 389, 390.
125. Id. at 399.
126. Id.
127. See White, supra note 102, at 5-6.
128. 53 I.L.R. at 329.
129. 53 I.L.R. 389 (1979).
130. See Greenwood, supra note 81, at 30.
131. Id.
132. 53 I.L.R. at 393-8.
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memorandum.'33 Libya objected to the arbitration procedure, stating
that the disputes were not subject to arbitration because the
nationalizations were acts of sovereignty. 134  After considering the
memorandum, the President of the ICJ named a sole arbitrator. 135 A
preliminary award was rendered in November of 1975, followed by an
award on the merits in January 1977.36
The TOPCO arbitrator looked at the whole issue in greater detail
and reached different conclusions about why TOPCO was entitled to
compensation.3 He first rejected the notion that the concession
agreement is an administrative contract." He then proceeded to
examine the nature and implications of the stabilization clause.' 39 First,
he stated that Clause 16 did not "in principle impair, the sovereignty of
the Libyan State" since all its sovereign legislative and regulatory
powers are preserved, as this power can be exercised with respect to
persons with whom the state has no contractual obligations.'40 On this
point he held that:
the recognition by international law of the right to nationalize is not
sufficient to empower a State to disregard its commitments, because
the same law also recognizes the power of a state to commit itself
internationally, especially by accepting the inclusion of stabilization
clauses in a contract entered into with a foreign private party.1
4 '
He then turned to the validity of stabilization clauses and reached
the following conclusion:
Thus, in respect of the international law of contracts, a nationalization
cannot prevail over an internationalized contract, containing
stabilization clauses, entered into between a State and a foreign
private company. The situation could be different only if one were to
conclude that the exercise by a State of its right to nationalize place
that State on a level outside of and superior to the contract and also to
the international legal order itself, and constitutes an act of
government which is beyond the scope of any judicial redress or any
criticism.
142
The importance of the TOPCO arbitration is: (1) the arbitrator
internationalized the contract; and, (2) he interpreted the stabilization
133. See von Mehren & Kourides, supra note 102, at 489.
134. Id. at 489.
135. Id.
136. 53 I.L.R. 389 (1979).
137. See White, supra note 102, at 6.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. 17 I.L.M. 1, 24-25 (1978).
141. Id.
142. 17 I.L.M. at 25.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
clause as a basis to do so. In other words, the arbitrator held that when
the contract is internationalized, the parties act as equals and the state
host is bound by the guarantees it has offered to the investor.1
3
3. Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Government of the
Libyan Arab Republic. "'
The last arbitration involving the Libyan nationalizations was the
LIAMCO case. This case was identical to TOPCO, except that the
company was one of the smaller independent oil companies whose
participation had been encouraged by the Royal Libyan Government.
145
LIAMCO was a Delaware corporation that owned an undivided twenty-
five and one-half percent interest in three concessions at the time of the
Libyan revolution."6 Fifty-one percent of the LIAMCO interests were
nationalized at the same time the TOPCO nationalizations took place. 7
Again, when LIAMCO commenced arbitrations its remaining interests
were nationalized."" The arbitration proceedings followed the same
pattern as the TOPCO arbitration, with Libya refusing to participate in
the case. 4 1 The President of the ICJ, at the request of LIAMCO, named
a sole arbitrator and the award was given on April 12, 1977.'50
In analyzing the stabilization clause, the sole arbitrator found that
the clause was "justified not only by the said Libyan petroleum
legislation, but also by the general principle of the sanctity of contracts
recognized also in municipal and international law."". He went on to
state that since LIAMCO's concession agreements were binding they
could not validly be terminated unless there was "mutual consent of the
contracting parties, in compliance with the said principle of the sanctity
of contracts and particularly with the explicit terms of Clause 16 of the
Agreements.""' The conclusions of the award, however, were not
consistent with the views of the arbitrator concerning the validity of the
stabilization clauses. It is thus difficult to evaluate how the
stabilization clause influenced the award."1
3
143. See White, supra note 102, at 11.
144. 62 I.L.R. 140 (1977); 20 I.L.M. 1 (1977).
145. 62 I.L.R. at 155.
146. Id. at 155-56.
147. Id. at 162.
148. Id. at 165.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 165-220.
151. 62 I.L.R. at 31.
152. Id. at 62.
153. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 65, at 44.
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C. Other Cases Involving Stabilization Clauses
1. AGIP v. Popular Republic of Congo."
On January 12, 1974, all the oil distribution sector in the Congo
was nationalized.155 This measure affected all companies in the sector,
except for AGIP, who a few days earlier negotiated with the government
the sale of fifty percent of AGIP's capital.5 ' The agreement between
AGIP and the government contained several stabilization clauses 5 7 and
an arbitration clause. On April 12, 1975, the President of Congo
ordered the nationalization of AGIP.1"8 Following this order, the army
occupied the company's headquarters and seized all of its assets, files
and accounting records."59
AGIP filed an application for arbitration." Like the TOPCO
arbitrator, the tribunal held that stabilization clauses freely accepted
by the Government "do not affect the principles of its sovereign
legislative and regulatory powers, since it retains both in relations to
those, whether national or foreigners, with whom it has not entered into
such obligations."161 Hence, the stabilization clauses were held to be
valid and enforceable under international law.162
2. Government of the State of Kuwait v. American Independent
Oil Co. ("Aminoil")13
In 1948, the ruler of Kuwait granted a sixty-year oil concession to
Aminoil, a United States corporation." This concession agreement
included a stabilization clause that stated:
The Skaikh shall not by general or special legislation or by
administrative measures or by any other act whatever annul this
Agreement except as provided in Article 11. No alteration shall be
154. 21 I.L.M. 726 (1982).
155. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 65, at 44.
156. 21 I.L.M. at 727.
157. In one of the stabilization clauses, the government adopted measures to prevent
the application to the Company of future amendments to the law affecting the structure
and composition of the Company's bodies. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 65, at 45.
158. 21 I.L.M. at 729.
159. See Christopher Koa, The International Bank for Reconstruction & Development
& Dispute Resolution: Conciliating and Arbitrating with China through the International
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 439, 459 (1991).
160. Id.
161. 21 I.L.M. at 735-36.
162. See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 9, at 245.
163. 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982).
164. George Delaume, Comparative Analysis as a Basis of Law in State Contracts: The
Myth of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TuL. L. REV. 575, 606 (Feb. 1989).
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made in the terms of this Agreement by either the Shaikh or the
Company except in the event of the Shaikh or the Company jointly
agreeing that it is desirable in the interest of both parties to make
certain alterations, relations or additions to this Agreement.
16
In 1961, a supplemental agreement was negotiated which amended
the 1948 concession. 166 In 1977, after several years of trying to modify
the agreement and increase Aminoil's payments, Kuwait enacted a law
that terminated the concession agreement. 167  In 1979, the parties
agreed to submit their dispute to an ad hoc tribunal. 68
Aminoil claimed that the concession agreement was wrongfully
terminated because there was a stabilization clause and termination of
the agreement was a violation of international law. 169  Because the
concession agreement was renegotiated several times, the tribunal
found that the "stabilization clauses, as no longer possessed their
former absolute character." 70 The tribunal, however, did not find that
stabilization clauses would not prevent termination, if such clauses
were still considered binding. Additionally, the tribunal expressly
rejected Kuwait's contention of permanent sovereignty.'
V. CONCLUSION
Nations with substantial petroleum reserves, without the financial
capacity to develop these resources, continue to rely on foreign oil
companies to undertake the financial and technological development,
exploration and production of these resources. This is particularly true
with the emergence of new independent states in Central and Eastern
Europe. Petroleum concession agreements thus continue to be used by
private parties and foreign companies.
Stabilization clauses will continue to be used in concession
agreements to protect foreign companies from subsequent unilateral
actions by the foreign state. To meet this challenge, it is important for
companies and host countries to understand how, when and why
stabilization clauses have been used in the past and how arbitral
awards have treated stabilization clauses. The decisions discussed in
this article show that such clauses are taken seriously by arbitrators.
The precise language used in the clauses has not been particularly
significant; rather, they are generally analyzed from a policy-based
perspective that considers the limitation on sovereignty expressed by
165. 21 I.L.M. at 990-91.
166. Id. at 991.
167. Id. at 998.
168. See Delaume, supra note 164, at 607.
169. Id..
170. 21 I.L.M. at 1024.
171. See Garcia-Amador, supra note 65, at 48.
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such a clause in light of all the circumstances surrounding the
transaction.

